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Rangers in Combat: A Legacy of Valor
Note from the author, J.D. Lock, regarding the following excerpt, a chapter on Ranger Pat Tillman's death as a result of friendly-fire, and the lessons that the Army must learn from it - a chapter omitted from the final publication of "Rangers in Combat: A Legacy of Valor."
I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our enemies designs.DATE: 22 April 2004 WAR/CONFLICT: Global War on Terror, Afghanistan LOCATION: vicinity of Khost, Paktia Province (along the Pakistan border) MISSION: Ranger platoon conducts a "reconnaissance in force to kill or capture anti-coalition members' found." BACKGROUND: In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, a United States led coalition launched an assault on Al Qaeda training camps and Taliban regime military installations in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Within seventy-six days, on 22 December, a new Afghanistan government under the leadership of Chairman Hamid Karzai was established in Kabul. By 7 February 2002, the coalition commander, General Tommy Franks, was testifying to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the "safe harbor" for Al Qaeda that had been provided by the Taliban government inside Afghanistan had been eliminated. Though the Taliban government of Afghanistan was no longer providing a refuge for al Qaeda, Afghanis were still not at peace; their land was fraught with danger. Al Qaeda and Taliban elements still roamed unfettered in places, terrorizing the countryside. In reprisal, US ground forces executed Operation Mountain Storm, routine sweeps of the countryside in search of the enemy. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 also ushered in a renewed sense of patriotism, one of selfless service and personal sacrifice, as thousands of volunteers enlisted in the armed forces of the United State to serve in the Global War on Terror. Perhaps no one exemplified this type of service or sacrifice better than Patrick D. Tillman who proved to be much more than 'just' a football player. Tillman, a 'free-spirit' as a kid, demonstrated his grit by high-diving from bridges and cliffs. The recipient of the last football scholarship available from Arizona State in 1994, a flamboyant Tillman went on to become a noted All-Pac-10 linebacker whose trademark on the field was the delivery of bone-jarring hits. Off the field, he was known to hop a fence, climb a ladder and meditate on a light tower in Arizona State's Sun Devil Stadium. In 1997, he helped lead the Sun Devils to the Rose Bowl. A season later, after being named the Pac-10 Defensive Player of the Year, Tillman graduated early, summa cum laude with a 3.84 grade-point average. Considered too small for a linebacker and too slow for a defensive back, Tillman was drafted by the Arizona Cardinals in the seventh round of the 1998 NFL draft, the 226th player of 241 selected. After making a reputation as a special team player, he played his way into the starting strong safety position within five months. During the 2000 season, Tillman broke the team record with 223 tackles. Running a marathon prior to training camp for the 2000 season, he challenged himself even further by competing in a 70-mile triathlon prior to the 2001 season. A man whose focus was not of wealth nor fame, Tillman turned down a $9 million, five-year offer from the Super Bowl champion St. Louis Rams out of loyalty to the Cardinals in 2001. Then came the events of September 2001. Profoundly affected by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Tillman felt an intense desire and obligation to "pay something back" for the rewarding life he had been afforded through professional sports. "I play football. It just seems so unimportant compared to everything that has taken place," he told NFL Films after the September 11 attacks, noting that his grandfather had been at Pearl Harbor. "A lot of my family has gone and fought wars, and I really haven't done a damn thing." In the prime of his professional career, he passed up a lucrative $3.6 million three-year contract with the Cardinals at the completion of his fourth National Football League season. Returning from his honeymoon with his wife, Marie-she was his high-school sweetheart, Pat Tillman slipped off to Denver where he enlisted in May 2002 in the U.S. Army Rangers with his younger brother, Kevin, a former minor league baseball prospect in the Cleveland Indian's farm organization, both for a private's salary of $18,000 a year. There was no public statement from the Ranger enlistees; they shunned publicity. As college graduates, the Tillman's could have pursued commissions as officers. That would have taken time, however, and would also have eliminated their chance of serving with the Ranger Regiment for a number of years. Only an enlisted contract could provide that guarantee. Such was their desire to be Army Rangers. Refusing all interview requests upon joining the Army, the Tillman brothers moved through the required training programs, completing basic combat training (BCT) in July, advanced individual training (AIT) as infantrymen (11B) in October and Airborne School in November. Finally, with completion of the Ranger Indoctrination Program (RIP) in December, the two found themselves assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment in Fort Lewis, Washington. Within less than a year of his enlistment, Pat Tillman was in action during the initial months of Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003) where one of his first duties was replacing a heavy weapons gunner who was killed within minutes of the start of a firefight. The Tillman brothers served together in the 2nd Platoon, A Company, 2nd Battalion of the 75th Ranger Regiment. Known as the "Black Sheep," the Ranger platoon, along with other elements of their battalion, were transferred from Iraq in the spring of 2004 to eastern Afghanistan. Working with Afghan allies, CIA paramilitaries and other special forces elements, the Rangers executed small unit sweep and search operations as they conducted grid-by-grid (map grids) patrols to flush out, entrap, and kill enemy guerrillas. On 13 April 2004, the three Ranger platoons of A Company deployed from a clandestine base near the Pakistan border to begin a week long series of anti-Taliban sweeps. Upon completion of that mission, the company commander, company executive officer and two of the platoons returned to base. Remaining behind were the 'Black Sheep' Rangers of 2nd Platoon who were to continue sweep and search operations along the broken roads and within the barren rock canyons of Paktia province. COMBAT: First Lieutenant David A. Uthlaut, a West Point graduate and his class' 'First Captain,' was the platoon leader. Under his command were 34 Rangers and nine operational vehicles. Right from the start, there was a problem. One of the vehicles, a Humvee, broke down the first night and could not be repaired in the field. The platoon moved out the next morning with the broken Humvee towed by straps. For several hours, the Rangers moved along rock strewed trails, the towed Humvee periodically colliding as a result of its 'slinky-like' movement with the vehicle towing it. Deep inside Taliban territory, Uthlaut soon found himself having to stop around noon in the tiny village of Margarah. Constant collisions had resulted in the front end of the towed Humvee buckling which prevented it from being pulled any farther. By now, the platoon was nearly 24 hours behind schedule. By radio, the distant Ranger Regiment Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at Bagram, near Kabul, informed Uthlaut that a helicopter would not be available for days to air-lift the damaged vehicle back to base. Uthlaut's situation was further exacerbated by a senior TOC officer's berating of the A Company commander that "This vehicle problem better not delay us any more." By this time, the platoon should have been executing clearing operations in the southeastern Afghanistan village of Manah. While those at the Regimental TOC debated the delay, Uthlaut focused on a solution. By 4 PM, he felt he had one. A local towing vehicle called a "jinga truck" could be hired to haul the disabled Humvee to a location where the vehicle could be secured and transported back by another Army element. The only remaining issue was whether Uthlaut should keep his platoon together until the Humvee was secured, or should his element be split into two serials, with half immediately moving on Manah while the remainder transported the vehicle to the pickup site. Feeling the pressure at the TOC to report movement on the objective, Uthlaut's commander directed the lieutenant to split his platoon. Uthlaut felt differently, though, and recommended in an email "sending our whole platoon up to the highway and then having us go together to the villages." By now it was 5:03 PM and even with the platoon split as ordered by his commander, Uthlaut realized that the element moving on Manah would not be able to arrive and execute a search prior to darkness falling. Regimental standing operating procedures (SOP) prevented nighttime searches under their current circumstances. The company commander would have none of that, though, and again ordered Uthlaut to immediately get half of his platoon moving on Manah. Pressing the issue, the lieutenant queried if they were to ignore the SOP and execute a night time sweep? "No," replied his commander. Amazed at the implication, Uthlaut continued to press. "So the only reason you want me to split up is so I can get boots on the ground in sector [in the search area] before it gets dark?" "Yes," was the astonishing reply. Pressing one last time, the Ranger on the ground reminded his commander that he only had one heavy weapon, a .50-caliber machine gun, for his entire platoon and would that change his order? "No, it does not." Realizing that the debate was now over, the Ranger lieutenant did as ordered. A hasty plan was quickly devised by the platoon leader. The orders were given and the unit was swiftly split into two serials [sections]. Serial 1 with the platoon leader and Ranger Pat Tillman would move directly on Manah. Serial 2 with the platoon sergeant, Ranger Kevin Tillman and the jinga truck with broke Humvee would initially follow Serial 1 and then veer off to the highway where the Humvee was to be picked up. The hostile landscape was darkening as the two serials moved out a little after 6 PM. For nearly five hours, the platoon had remained stationary in Margarah and the Rangers knew that if any Al Qaeda or Taliban guerrillas were planning an ambush, they had plenty of time to establish one. Nerves were stretched, blood pressure was high as their eyes scanned the surrounding countryside. Serial 1 negotiated a steep canyon, five to 10 yards across at its narrowest, with no difficulty. Moving through without incident, the lieutenant and his men continued their drive, eventually stopping outside Sperah, a small village of mud huts and a new mosque near Manah, 40 kilometers southwest of Khowst. Behind them, Serial 2 had to stop shortly after turning off the main road to head towards the drop off point for the broke Humvee. Finding the worn road too pitted with deep holes, unable to proceed any farther, the Afghan tow truck driver stopped and recommended to the Ranger platoon sergeant that they turn around and follow Serial 1's route past Manah where they could link up with the highway and then circle back to the drop off point. The platoon sergeant agreed. Tragically and inexplicably, Serial 2's change in plans were not conveyed to Serial 1. The seventeen Rangers of Serial 2 all loaded in six vehicles and the Afghan tow truck towing the broke Humvee, began to make their way down into the narrow canyon that Serial 1 had recently exited. The time was 6:34 PM. Suddenly, within the first minute of entering the canyon, there was an explosion. The platoon sergeant and many of the other Rangers in Serial 2 thought that a vehicle had either run over a land mine or been struck by an improvised explosive device (IED). The heaviest-armed vehicle within the platoon-the gun vehicle-was in Serial 2, a Humvee commanded by Sergeant Greg Baker. Positioned immediately behind the Afghan tow truck, Baker's vehicle was outfitted with the M-2 .50-caliber machine gun, an M-240B 7.62mm machine gun and an M-249 5.56mm squad automatic weapon (SAW). Two of Baker's men had yet to see combat. Ranger Kevin Tillman manned an MK-19 Grenade Machine Gun in the serial's trail vehicle, well to the rear. With the first explosion, Baker's vehicle slammed to a halt. Leaving gunners on the .50 cal and M240B machine guns, the remainder of the Rangers swiftly dismounted and established security around their vehicle. The sergeant scanned the sheer canyon walls overhead for signs of an enemy. He noticed rocks falling. Suddenly, there were two more explosions-believed mortar rounds. Baker and his men thought they heard the rat-tat of enemy small-arms fire and could see enemy movement along the canyon walls. Believing they had been ambushed, Baker and his men opened fire. From their location in Sperah, the Rangers of Serial 1 heard explosions and small arms fire from the canyon through which they had passed. Unaware of Serial 2's proximity and unable to see an enemy or to make an adequate assessment of the situation without additional information, Lieutenant Uthlaut quickly designated his squad leaders-sergeants-and fire team leaders to move back towards the canyon "to press the fight." Ranger Pat Tillman was one of those fire team leaders and he began to move with his men following a squad leader on foot up a rocky north-south ridge line that faced the ravine on a generally perpendicular angle. As the Rangers in his serial moved out, Uthlaut attempted to establish contact on his radio with Serial 2 to determine their location and to coordinate their movement in his battle plan. Unfortunately for all concerned, Serial 2 was deep within the gorge by this time, unable to communicate by radio because of the high canyon walls. The battle drill for an ambush, especially an ambush within a canyon, is simple-lay down heavy return fire and get out of the ambush's 'kill zone' as quickly as possible! Scrambling back to their vehicle, Baker and his men quickly encountered a major obstacle to their plan-the jinga tow truck to their immediate front was stopped, blocking their route of escape, the vehicle's two occupants, the driver and his Afghan interpreter, just standing about. Running forward, Baker grabbed the two men standing about and tossed them back into their truck. Joining them inside, the sergeant pressed the driver to get moving. With Baker firing up the canyon walls, the jinga began to move through the defile, followed by Baker's gun vehicle. Running out of ammunition, Baker dashed back to his vehicle to reload. Once again, the tow truck came to a halt but this time, there was enough room for Baker's vehicle to pass. Machine guns firing and wheels grasping for traction in the dirt and gravel, the Humvee accelerated out of the canyon. The sun was setting and figures began to take on the image of silhouettes. The sergeant with Tillman observed muzzle flashes from the high northern ridge line, approximately a half mile away. Pat Tillman approached the non-commissioned officer (NCO), reporting that he could see the enemy on the southern ridge line. He followed that report with a request to drop his heavy and cumbersome body armor, to which the sergeant immediately replied, "No," and then directed Tillman, a second Ranger and an Afghan militia fighter who was part of the platoon's traveling party to move down the slope and into a position from which they could engage the enemy. Tillman and two men moved smartly into position and began to fire their weapons toward the canyon. From a distance, another Ranger observed Tillman's exposed position with concern. As Baker's gun vehicle raced from the canyon toward Sperah in the distance, the Rangers on board had no idea that their comrades in Serial 1 were to their front. A vehicle occupant yelled, "Contact right!," with the appearance of muzzle flashes on a ridge to the right of the village. Without hesitation, every weapon on Baker's vehicle opened fire at the flashes. At Ranger Pat Tillman's location, a tracer streaked by. Other Rangers within Serial 1 saw it and the thought of friendly fire should have started to take shape in their minds. Machine gun ammunition is usually linked as "4+1"…four conventional rounds with the fifth a tracer round. Tracer bullets have a coating on them that ignites from the friction of flight, thus allowing the gunner to spot where his rounds are striking and to adjust fires accordingly. They also come in two colors-green and red. Red tracers are used by United States and NATO forces while most other nations use the Soviet/Russian color convention of green. For the Rangers in Serial 1, the tracer was an ominous omen and should have caused immediate suspicion, for it was red. Driving at high speed, Baker's gun vehicle continued to advance. Baker focused his fires on a prone figure wearing no helmet who was firing an AK-47 approximately 100 meters away. Following their sergeant's lead, the other members of his team fired at the same target. The vehicle trailing Baker's was not far behind. Accelerating out of the canyon, it's driver quickly caught sight of Serial 1's parked vehicles just ahead. Then, to his right, he saw the bearded Afghan firing an AK-47. Momentarily confused, the driver quickly realized the Afghan was a militia ally when he spotted the remainder of Serial 1 on top of the ridge. "We have friendlies on top! We have friendlies on top!" Unfortunately, this warning along with yells to cease fire went unheeded in Baker's vehicle just ahead. In a hail of bullets, the bearded Afghan militia soldier who was part of Pat Tillman's fire team was killed. As the gun vehicle rolled into sight, the Ranger closest to Tillman made eye contact with some of the vehicle occupants, but to no avail as Baker's team began to open up. Ranger fire discipline broke down quickly in the gun vehicle as it pulled alongside the ridge where many of the Serial 1 Rangers were located. With no more clearly identified targets following the Afghan's death, incoming fire, or directives from Sergeant Baker, the vehicle's gunners should have remained poised and ready, but with their fingers off the triggers. Instead, they began to discharge an undisciplined volley of heavy fire at "shapes" they'd spotted in the distance. Within moments, a fusillade of hundreds of rounds fired in heavy bursts began to impact around the Serial 1 Rangers on the ridge and in Sperah behind the ridge where the platoon leader, Lieutenant Uthlaut, and his radio operator (RTO) were trapped, pinned down by the fires of their own men. Now under heavy fire from their comrades, Tillman and the other Rangers around him on the ridge began to shout and to wave their arms widely in an effort to get Baker's gun vehicle to stop firing. Though the gunners spotted three or four waving arms-the traditional hand-and-arm signal for cease fire-they only increased their rate of fire. In desperation, the Rangers under fire shouted, screamed and waved some more. "Ranger! Ranger! Cease fire!," but their cries went unheeded. Tillman, himself, came up with a good idea and tossed a smoke grenade to serve as a signal. As the device lay on the ground, flame sputtered and a thick, white smoke unfurled, rising into the air. Within moments, the fire from Baker's gun vehicle ceased. The cacophony of combat had been replaced by peaceful silence. Relieved, the Serial 1 Rangers began to stand up, and stretching, they joked about the near fatal mishap. The smoke from Tillman's grenade continued to obscure some of the ridge, but unnoticed in the distance Baker's Humvee began to move. Suddenly, there was a burst of heavy machine gun fire from the vehicle and Tillman and those around him realized that the cease fire merely allowed the gun vehicle to reposition itself with an unobstructed view. The Serial 1 Rangers once again scrambled for cover, and screamed for their comrades to cease fire. With the initial burst of gunfire, Pat Tillman fell behind a boulder. Another young Ranger lay prone beside him. Tracers continued to impact around and whiz by the two men. In pain, Tillman cried out, "Cease fire! Friendlies!," and yelled his name. Repeatedly, the stricken Ranger continued to shout until he finally grew silent. The young Ranger alongside Tillman began to yell, "Oh my God!," scared to death, unsure of what to do as he watched a heavy stream of blood pour from the head of the mortally wounded Tillman. The firing continued. Farther up the ridge, a sergeant fired a flare. Still on the move and still firing, Baker's vehicle finally drove past the ridge to find parked before them the Serial 1 Humvees. Baker quickly glanced down the road they had traveled, looked back up the ridge they'd been firing on, then spotted the flare hanging from its parachute drifting above. A feeling of horror must have descended over the sergeant as he ordered his men to cease-fire. Finally, the vehicle's guns fell silent-but not before the 50-caliber machine gun had run out of ammunition. It was approximately 7:30 PM. From the moment Serial 2 had entered the canyon until the final shots were fired, only 17 minutes had passed. The vehicles of Serial 2 pulled into Sperah. Angered by the confusion and still unaware of events transpired, the platoon sergeant dismounted his vehicle in search of his platoon leader and Serial 1 commander. Finding Uthlaut sitting near a wall in the village, the senior NCO sat down forcefully next to the lieutenant, and pointedly asked what he was doing. It was only then that the sergeant spotted the blood around his mouth. Both Uthlaut and his radio telephone operator (RTO) were wounded. On the ridge, another sergeant was taking charge, ensuring a security perimeter was established. A report was submitted by radio to the Regimental TOC in Bagram that 2nd Platoon forces "were no longer in contact." Nine minutes later, there was a request to the TOC for a Medevac helicopter and the report of two Killed in Action (KIA). One was the Afghan militia soldier; the other was Pat Tillman, age 27. Ranger Kevin Tillman arrived at Sperah in Serial 2's trail vehicle. Unaware of what had occurred earlier on the ridge, Ranger Tillman took up security on the perimeter as directed. He only learned of his brother's death later, when it was mentioned to him by another platoon member. OBSERVATION: Millions of Americans were stunned and grief-stricken to learn of Ranger Specialist Pat Tillman's death on 22 April 2004; his story is one of selfless service and personal sacrifice for the greater good. However, despite that loss, we took solace at that time in the account of his death for it was one of courage and valor. As reported, the story of Tillman's death was worthy of legend. Within a week, on 30 April, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) presented a nine paragraph account of Pat Tillman's final moments, awarding him, posthumously, a Silver Star-the third highest award for valor-and a promotion from Specialist to Corporal (an NCO) for his leadership potential. Part of the statement read: He ordered his team to dismount and then maneuvered the Rangers up a hill near the enemy's location. As they crested the hill, Tillman directed his team into firing positions and personally provided suppressive fire. Through the firing Tillman's voice was heard issuing commands to take the fight to the enemy on the dominating high ground. Only after his team engaged the well-armed enemy did it appear their fires diminished. As a result of his leadership and his team's efforts, the platoon trail section was able to maneuver through the ambush to positions of safety without a single casualty.The national homage to Pat Tillman was overflowing. At a memorial service in the Ranger's hometown of San Jose, California, on 3 May, Senator John McCain, R-Arizona, spoke of Tillman as "a most honorable man" and noted: "While many of us will be blessed to live a longer life, few of us will live a better one." Shortly, thereafter, a public memorial service was held on 8 May at Sun Devil Stadium and the Arizona Cardinal professional football team retired his player number '40.' Thousands attended, including politicians and celebrities, and the plaza surrounding the Cardinal's newly constructed stadium in Glendale was renamed "Pat Tillman Freedom Plaza." It was an inspiring and fitting tribute for the Army's most notable volunteer in the Global War on Terror. Pat Tillman, the charismatic, professional football player who had 'walked the walk' by enlisting as a United States Army Ranger in the service of his nation, was a fitting example of the best that this nation had to offer. Pat Tillman had scarcely been laid to rest when the "heroic story" of his death began to unravel. In a word, he was a victim of fratricide. But the truth was hard to come out: the U.S. Army and its Rangers had intentionally fabricated a self-serving, glorified story of Ranger Corporal Pat Tillman's death. To many, it must have seemed like a low-point in recent Ranger history. On the same day Tillman was being publicly eulogized in Arizona, Colonel James C. Nixon, commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, was accepting the investigative findings of Ranger Tillman's last battle. Inclusive of the findings were the following:
The next day, 29 May, the Army finally acknowledged that friendly fire "probably" killed Ranger Pat Tillman. "While there was no one specific finding of fault, the investigation results indicate that Corporal Tillman probably died as a result of friendly fire while his unit was engaged in combat with enemy forces." The Army spokesman went on to remark that the firefight took place in "very severe and constricted terrain with impaired light" with an enemy force of ten to twelve combatants. Afghan military officials, however, speaking on the condition of anonymity, contradicted that assessment. Afghan militia assigned with the 2nd Ranger platoon had observed "no enemy forces" in the area when Tillman was killed. When pressed as to why it took so long to acknowledge that Tillman had been killed by friendly fire, a spokesman for CENTCOM replied that the investigation's disclosure was "in accordance with DoD [Department of Defense] policies." Pressed further to explain why CENTCOM had withheld any indication of fratricide while the Army had collected at least 14 witness statements by 26 April indicating such an event had occurred, the spokesman answered, "The specific details of this incident were not known until the completion of the investigation." A public affairs officer for USASOC would later maintain that standard policy had been followed regarding the disclosure of fratricide evidence and remarked: "All the services do not prematurely disclose any investigation findings until the investigation is complete." Regarding the Silver Star narrative released on 30 April, the USASOC spokesman stated that it had been written based on information provided by Ranger commanders in the field. The unassailable truth, as finally acknowledged by the Army, was that Ranger Pat Tillman had been killed by his own comrades, and the Army command had known this prior to their 30 April news release. Thus, incredibly, despite having confirmation in hand, leading Army officers allowed Senator John McCain to address the 3 May memorial service as the main speaker without a hint of what had actually happened, or even an acknowledgment that there was an ongoing investigation into the circumstances of Tillman's death. Later, Senator McCain stated, "I think it would have been helpful to have at least their [U.S. Army] suspicions known." The truth about Pat Tillman's death was not just held from political leaders and the public, it was also consciously concealed by the Ranger chain of command from Pat Tillman's Ranger brother, Kevin, Pat's widow, Marie, and his parents. Even as Mary Tillman, Pat's mother, pressed for details surrounding the death, the Army repeatedly ignored any requests for additional information. Senator McCain interceded with the Army for answers on Mary's behalf. A year later, on 14 April 2005, it was announced that an investigation ordered in November 2004 by then Army Secretary Les Brownlee aiming to address concerns raised about whether the Army held back information regarding Ranger Pat Tillman's death had been completed. In a brief statement, a spokesman for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) noted that while the findings of the investigation would not be made public, there was "a degree of satisfaction expressed by the family" when briefed of the results. However, when asked by The Arizona Republic whether the family was satisfied with the investigation results, Patrick Tillman, Sr., replied: "No. And I don't want to talk about it." Later, on 22 May 2005, it was reported that in an interview following the Washington Post's 4 May 2005 release of its own investigation of Ranger Pat Tillman's death and its implied findings of an Army cover-up, Tillman's parents took a tougher stand. They believed "the military and the government [had] created a heroic tale about how their son died to foster a patriotic response across the country." FRATRICIDE-also referred to as 'Friendly Fire'-is defined by the 1991 General Officer Steering Committee as "the employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment that results in the unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel." There is an adage within the Army that states "Friendly fire is not friendly" for all bullets or munitions can kill, and have done so many times in the past, lest we forget. Fratricide is not a new problem in warfare. It only seems more prevalent, now, for technology and forensics provide the wherewithal to determine 'who shot whom.' Friendly Fire has been around as long as there have been army's slugging it out in what Karl von Clausewitz-the author of On War-defined as 'the friction of war'-or as others have referred to it as 'the fog of war.' America's history was significantly impacted by fratricide when Civil War Confederate General Thomas J. 'Stonewall' Jackson was mortally wounded by his own men the evening of 2 May 1863 as he returned from a reconnaissance of the forward lines having just achieved the South's greatest victory of the war at Chancellorsville. Who knows if the North would have prevailed if General Robert E. Lee had Stonewall Jackson, his 'right arm,' with him at Gettysburg, just weeks later? Fratricide also occurs on a relatively large scale as demonstrated during World War II when the U.S. Navy mistakenly shot down twenty-three C-47 transports carrying 82nd Airborne Division paratroopers as they flew over the fleet on their approach to drop into Sicily. Over 400 died. Later, following the Normandy invasion, the commander of 1st Army Group, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair-posthumously promoted to General-was accidentally killed on 25 July 1944 at the start of Operation Cobra, the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, near Saint-Lo by an aerial bombardment of the U.S. Army Air Corps. In two days at the start of Cobra, the Army Air Corps accidentally killed 136 and wounded 621 American soldiers. Nearly a half century later, the legacy of fratricide continues, only now with more finesse, "One shot, one kill," if you please. During Operation Desert Storm on 27 February 1991, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division was engaged in a night battle in southern Iraq against elements of the Republican Guard when two rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) detonated with no effect on an M1A1 Abrams tank. Nearby, the crew of another Abrams was scanning the area with their thermal sights and mistook the RPG detonations on the M1A1's armor as enemy gunfire. The single 120mm depleted uranium (DU) round fired at the other tank resulted in the destruction of the Abrams and its four-man crew. In a highly publicized incident on 14 April 1994, two F-15C Eagle fighter aircraft and their support Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) controllers misidentified two Black Hawk UH-60 helicopters flying north of the 36th parallel in Iraq in the "No Fly Zone" as Iraqi Hind gunship helicopters. Despite a visual identification flyby by one of the F-15C's, both Black Hawks were downed with a $1 million AIM-120 AMRAAM and an AIM-9 Sidewinder missile. Redundant and supposedly 'fail safe' system of protocols had failed and the result was 26 crewmen and passengers killed, and two $6 million helicopters destroyed. The Global War on Terror (GWOT) has also resulted in its share of fratricide. There is the incident on 5 December 2001, when a B-52 dropped a 2,000-pound satellite-guided Joint Direct-Attack Munition (JDAM) in response to a U.S. Army Special Forces ('Green Berets') close air support request. The bomb detonated approximately 100 meters from the American Green Berets and their Iraqi Northern Alliance allies, resulting in the deaths of three Americans and five Afghans. The findings of the investigation would conclude the bomb's attack coordinates were incorrectly entered on the ground by the forward air controller (FAC). Four months later, on 18 April 2002, another fratricide air-strike resulted in four Canadian soldiers killed and eight others wounded when a U.S. Air National Guard F-16 Falcon mistook Canadian small arms fire during a night time live-fire training on a range as enemy fire and dropped a 500-pound laser-guided bomb on the troops. Most recently, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), a Navy F/A-18 Hornet and British Royal Air Force Tornado were brought down over Iraq in two separate incidents by Army Patriot missiles, resulting in all three pilots and crewman being lost. And, despite 'Combat Identification' and 'Blue Force Tracking' (BFT), ground troops are not yet immune to friendly fire as demonstrated by an Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle firing on an Army artillery position south of Baghdad, killing one soldier and wounding several others. Even when all planning and coordination has been properly executed, there is still no guarantee that the final outcome will not result in friendly casualties. The Marines of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines found this to be true when they called for artillery support as they fought to secure a bridge near Nasiriyah, Iraq. Misranged, the massive bombardment of artillery rounds fell short on the 2nd Battalion's positions. Radios failed and the Marines were forced to endure 90 minutes of friendly fire while they worked to repair their broken communications to call a cease fire. By the time the final round had detonated, nine Marines had been killed, and 28 wounded. Fratricide is not just an American problem; it is intrinsic to any armed forces. On a large scale during World War II, a squadron of the German Luftwaffe-Air Force-mistakenly dropped its payload on their own civilians in Freibrug-im-Breisgau on 20 May 1940, rather than on the French town of Dijon. The results were the deaths of fifty-seven Germans. Nearly a half century later, at the other end of the spectrum on a smaller scale, a Queen's Royal Lancers British Challenger II tank fired on another Challenger II near Basra, Iraq, on 24 March 2003 at the start of OIF. The targeted tank was in a 'turret-down' position-meaning the vast majority of the tank was below ground level and could not be seen-and identified by other British soldiers as an Iraqi bunker. Clearance to shoot was granted which resulted in two rounds being fired. Both rounds struck the Challenger, blowing off the turret, killing two of the crew and seriously wounding the remaining two crewmembers. In the 1995 Spring edition of the military journal, Parameters, a study was published of fratricide during US wars from World War I to the most recent conflict at the time, Operation Desert Storm (the Persian Gulf). The study estimated the percentage Killed in Action (KIA) and Wounded in Action (WIA) of the total overall wounded within each war/conflict. The study estimated that of all American military personnel wounded in World War I, approximately 10% of them were a result of fratricide. World War II estimates were 16% of those KIA and 12% of those WIA were a result of friendly fire. The Korean and Vietnam Conflicts resulted in overall fratricide casualty statistics of 7% and 12.5% respectively. Interestingly enough, the most recent military action at the time of the study, Operation Desert Storm (Persian Gulf), resulted in the highest percentages of losses as a consequence of fratricide, 15% WIA and 24% KIA. Based on these estimates, it is clear that fratricide is a statistically significant-and escalating-issue that must be addressed. An analysis of the historical data indicates that there are three primary causes of fratricide. The first is, simply, the human factor: a result of a lack of training and/or discipline, a lack of situational awareness and combat related stress. Then there are environmental impacts that are the result of visibility (weather/darkness) and terrain. And, finally, the march of technology in warfare: the ability to 'reach out and touch' with greater lethality at ranges beyond targeting sensor capability. There is a strong correlation between the effectiveness of a unit (as defined by training, cohesiveness and obeying commands) and its ability to control fratricide. However, given today's technology, fratricide has been severely reduced from the large scale issue it used to be. Now, it involves individuals or small sections on the ground or in the air, lone vehicles or misguided aircraft and the smallest targets. Given their elite status and training in small-scale warfare, the U.S. Army Rangers should be amongst the best at preventing fratricide. There is a popular adage that claims "Shit happens." Yes, it does, but usually as a result of someone's failure to plan or to execute properly. It's a vulgarism used by those looking for an excuse, or who claim no responsibility, or lack the ability to consign or to accept accountability. 'Shit' does not just happen, nor does fratricide. Fratricide invariably happens for a reason, and it's rarely acceptable. The ramifications on the human psyche of killing another human being are difficult enough without confounding it with the guilt feelings of killing a fellow soldier. I suggest that to minimize future fratricides, the Army needs to refocus its attention.
More than a decade prior, in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3 October 1993, poor communications seriously impacted the ability of the Task Force Ranger vehicle convoy to be properly guided from command and control aircraft above. Poor communications hindered the ability of dismounted Ranger and Delta elements to coordinate their movements to the first Black Hawk crash site. Nearly nine years later, on the mountain top of Takur Ghar, Afghanistan, on 4 March 2002, poor communications led to a Ranger Quick Reaction Force (QRF) flying directly into an al Qaeda ambush at 10,200 feet. And, once again, in the barren terrain of Afghanistan, on 22 April 2004, poor communications resulted in the fratricidal death of Ranger Specialist Pat Tillman. Situational Awareness failed as the two separate platoon elements, both led by seasoned Rangers, lost their relative positioning to each other. Ultimately, these cumulative failures created a formula for disaster that was triggered when Ranger fire discipline failed. Situational awareness in combination with knowing one's enemy leads, leads to Situational Understanding. It is this Situational Understanding that facilitates 'cool headed' leadership under fire. When confronted by an experienced, well-trained and well-armed enemy, it's generally 'Law of War #1' that the first who fires, lives. That, however, is not necessarily the case when dealing with insurgents or terrorists who, for the most part, are not trained or capable of delivering accurate fires. This inaccuracy provides US forces the time to more accurately develop the situation before laying down heavy suppressive fires that may or may not be directed at the wrong targets. A prime example of such situational misunderstandings were exemplified during the first Persian Gulf War, Desert Storm, in 1991 where crews of the M1 Abrams main battle tank invariably felt compelled on a number of occasions to fire first in long range engagements against unidentified and unverified targets. Why would they feel so compelled to do so? Other than another M1, there were no enemy vehicles capable of destroying an M1 on that battlefield. Mobility 'kill,' possible. But not a catastrophic kill that would wound or kill any crew members battened down inside. Thus, given this 'situational understanding' of enemy capabilities, why would the US chain of command not direct that no M1 fired unless it could positively verify its target, or it was fired on first, itself? Given this background of failures, there must be disciplining accountability. Without accountability, how can soldiers have confidence during future missions that something similar would not happen to them? In addition to accountability, there is also the issue of whether these failures warrant merely administrative action, or are they serious enough to warrant criminal charges? Within the U.S. Armed Forces, such punishments are left to the chain of command. In the Tillman case, the Ranger platoon's most senior officer was the 75th Ranger Regiment commander, Colonel James Nixon. He relied heavily upon the findings and judgments of the chief investigator who found significant fault with the enlisted and NCO platoon members. Commenting about the failures within Sergeant Baker's vehicle, the chief investigator noted that "While a great deal of discretion should be granted to a leader who is making difficult judgments in the heat of combat, the Command also has a responsibility to hold its leaders accountable when that judgment is so wanton or poor that it places the lives of other men at risk." It was, thus, Colonel Nixon's duty to determine whether or not any of his Rangers had crossed the line from 'accident' to 'crime' in regards to this fratricide. Had they followed their training or were they reckless and derelict in their duty to the point that there was no reasonable or just excuse, hence making Tillman's death one of manslaughter? Final disposition of the investigation led to one member of the Ranger platoon receiving formal administrative-Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)-charges. Four other Rangers, including a single officer, were transferred from the Ranger Regiment to other active duty assignments. Two additional officers were reprimanded, most likely ending, or at least curtailing, their military careers. (Note: Pursuant to Privacy Act restrictions, none of the names can be released.) An equally serious question is: Just how high up the chain of command should accountability reach? While the chief investigator reserved his harshest judgments for the lower-ranking members of the Ranger platoon, he also cast aspersions on the more senior-ranking officers who supervised the mission, focusing on process failures and communications problems, and less on the fact that decisions of these senior officers were contributory to the tragedy. Three officers received various forms of punishment; to some, that may imply complete accountability; to others, not enough. Those junior in rank have, rightly so, been held accountable for their mistakes. But especially those senior in rank, who sought to bury the truth about Tillman with accolades of heroic action and the awarding of a Silver Star, also did significant damage to the Profession of Arms and brought dishonor on the legacy of the United States Army Rangers. These senior ranked perpetrators of 'disinformation' only brought undeserved embarrassment to the family of the Ranger they attempted to honor. On 4 May 2005, the Washington Post reported "Army officials knew within days of Pat Tillman's death that the former NFL player had been killed by fellow Rangers." Furthermore, it added that General John P. Abizaid, theater commander, and other top Army officials "were aware an investigation had determined the death was caused by an act of 'gross negligence' four days before a nationally televised memorial service." It was also reported that despite the almost immediate initiation of an investigation, evidence had been destroyed by the burning of Pat Tillman's blood-soaked battle gear. Tillman's death occurred on 22 April 2004, just days prior to the shocking public disclosure of abuse by U.S. prison guards in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. Very likely these officers mistakenly sought to portray Ranger Tillman's death in the best possible light, not willing to expose the Army to a second 'black eye' within the same week. Given that the Army had collected at least 14 witness statements supporting the fratricide story by 26 April, but yet released Pat Tillman's Silver Star narrative four days later on 30 April, the same day the Abu Ghraib story broke, suggests a single, sad conclusion: there was a misguided effort by officers within the Army to place a positive, distorted and incomplete spin on the painful and unflattering facts of Ranger Tillman's death by withholding all evidence of fratricide, and by exaggerating Tillman's role, to make his death appear commanding and heroic. While junior members of the platoon were derelict in their duties in accordance with established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and the commissioned officers created a sense of urgency that did not exist, clearly the senior officers were equally derelict in their duties. Those who perpetuated the fraud by distorting and withholding the truth of Ranger Pat Tillman's fratricidal death have caused even more grievous damage by their duplicity. The credibility of not only a commissioned officer's word, but the credibility of a Ranger officer's word is shamed, in complete contradiction to the Ranger Creed and Rogers' Rangers Standing Orders. Stanzas 1 and 5 of the Ranger Creed: Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit de corps of the Rangers. Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy, and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country. Rogers' Rangers Standing Orders# 4: Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't ever lie to a Ranger or officer. Cover up, lies and deceit are unworthy of the United States Army, especially of Army Rangers. To cover up, lie and deceive for operational requirements is one thing; to cover up, lie and deceive for the self-serving reason of forestalling embarrassment is dishonorable and unworthy of a Ranger. Ultimately, though, we must subordinate our anger, and realize that the mistakes of some and the duplicity of others cannot detract an iota from the record that Ranger Pat Tillman fought bravely and honorably. Ranger Tillman's life was an example of truth and integrity. Sadly, with his loss, the very institution that he revered, the United States Army and the Rangers, did not live up to his own example. Records clearly indicate that Tillman fought bravely during his final battle, following orders, never wavering. Having lived and sacrificed the 'American Dream'-however short lived that dream may have been, Pat Tillman deserved to consider himself a man among men. However, he shunned attention; he sought no glory; he was 'just' an enlistee. As explained by his former Cardinal coach Dave McGinnis: Tillman "didn't want to be singled out from his brothers and sisters in the military." And, in support of an apparent pact with their Pat, his family has kept silent for the most part about his service. But, for Ranger Tillman, what was not public in life became very public in death. While the sacrifice of virtually all others killed in action has been hidden, suppressed, even censored, by an administration unwilling to publicly reveal the personal cost of war with the arrival of flag-draped caskets at Dover Air Force Base, Maryland, this painfully private Ranger ended up as a cause celebre. How sad. How terribly sad. Putting disingenuous and dishonorable actions by others aside, Ranger Pat Tillman, ironically, has become the one palpably public face to overshadow the concealed images of flag-draped coffins in this very necessary Global War On Terror. |
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